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Abstract—We enhance the physical-layer security (PLS) of
amplify-and-forward relaying networks with the aid of joint relay
and jammer selection (JRJS), despite the deliterious effect of
channel state information (CSI) feedback delays. Furthermore,
we conceive a new outage-based characterization approach for
the JRJS scheme. The traditional best relay selection (TBRS)
is also considered as a benchmark. We first derive closed-form
expressions of both the connection outage probability (COP) and
of the secrecy outage probability (SOP) for both the TBRS and
JRJS schemes. Then, a reliable-and-secure connection probability
(RSCP) is defined and analyzed for characterizing the effect
of the correlation between the COP and SOP introduced by
the corporate source-relay link. The reliability-security ratio
(RSR) is introduced for characterizing the relationship between
the reliability and security through the asymptotic analysis.
Moreover, the concept of effective secrecy throughput is defined
as the product of the secrecy rate and of the RSCP for the
sake of characterizing the overall efficiency of the system, as
determined by the transmit SNR, secrecy codeword rate and
the power sharing ratio between the relay and jammer. The
impact of the direct source-eavesdropper link and additional
performance comparisons with respect to other related selection
schemes are further included. Our numerical results show that
the JRJS scheme outperforms the TBRS method both in terms of
the RSCP as well as in terms of its effective secrecy throughput,
but it is more sensitive to the feedback delays. Increasing the
transmit SNR will not always improve the overall throughput.
Moreover, the RSR results demonstrate that upon reducing the
CSI feedback delays, the reliability improves more substantially
than the security degrades, implying an overall improvement in
terms of the security-reliability tradeoff. Additionally, the secrecy
throughput loss due to the second hop feedback delay is more
pronounced than that of the first hop.
Index Terms—Physical layer security; relay and jammer se-
lection; feedback delay; reliability and security; effective secrecy
throughput
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I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS communications systems are particularlyvulnerable to security attacks because of the inher-
ent openness of the transmission medium. Traditionally, the
information privacy of wireless networks has been focused
on the higher layers of the protocol stack employing crypto-
graphically secure schemes. However, these methods typically
assume a limited computing power for the eavesdroppers and
exhibit inherent vulnerabilities in terms of the inevitable secret
key distribution as well as management [1]. In recent years,
physical-layer security (PLS) has emerged as a promising
technique of improving the confidentiality wireless commu-
nications, which exploits the time varying properties of fading
channels, instead of relying on conventional cryptosystems.
The pivotal idea of PLS solutions is to exploit the dynamically
fluctuating random nature of radio channels for maximizing
the uncertainty concerning the source messages at the eaves-
dropper [2], [3].
To achieve this target, several PLS-enhancement approaches
have been proposed in the literature, including secrecy-
enhancing channel coding [4], secure on-off transmission
designs [5], secrecy-improving beamforming/precoding and
artificial noise (AN) aided techniques relying on multiple-
antennas [6], as well as secure relay-assisted transmission tech-
niques [7]. Specifically, apart from improving the reliability
and coverage of wireless transmissions, user cooperation also
has a great potential in terms of enhancing the wireless security
against eavesdropping attacks. There has been a growing in-
terest in improving the security of cooperative networks at the
physical layer [8-14]. To explore the spatial diversity potential
of the relaying networks and to boost the secrecy capacity (the
difference between the channel capacity of the legitimate main
link and that of the eavesdropping link), most of the existing
work has been focused on secrecy-enhancing beamforming
[8][9], as well as on intelligent relay node/jammer node
(RN/JN) selection, etc. Notably, given the availability of mul-
tiple relays, appropriately designed RN/JN selection is capable
of achieving a significant security improvement for cooperative
networks, which is emerging as a promising research topic. In
particular, Zou et al. investigated both amplify-and-forward
(AF) as well as decode-and-forward (DF) based optimal relay
selection conceived for enhancing the PLS in cooperative
wireless networks [10] and [11], where the global channel
state information (CSI) of both the main link and of the
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eavesdropping link was assumed to be available. Similarly,
jamming techniques which impose artificial interference on
the eavesdropper have also attracted substantial attention [12]-
[14]. More specifically, several sophisticated joint relay and
jammer selection schemes were proposed in [12], where the
beneficially selected relay increases the reliability of the main
link, while the carefully selected jammer imposes interference
on the eavesdropper and simultaneously protects the legitimate
destination from interference. In [13] and [14], cooperative
jamming has been studied in the context of bidirectional
scenarios and efficient RN/JN selection criteria have been
developed for achieving improved secrecy rates with the aid
of multiple relays. Furthermore, more effective relaying and
jamming schemes when taking the information leakage of
the source-eavesdropper link into consideration have been
presented lately in [15] and [16].
Nevertheless, an idealized assumption of the previously
reported research on PLS is the availability of perfect CSI,
which is regarded as a stumbling block in the way of invok-
ing practical secrecy-enhancing Wyner coding, on-off design,
beamforming/precoding, as well as RN/JN selection. However,
this idealized simplifying assumption is not realistic, since
practical channel estimation (CE) imposes CSI imperfections,
which are aggravated by the feedback delay, limited-rate feed-
back and channel estimation errors (CEE), etc [17]. Generally,
the related research has been focused on the issues of robust
secure beamforming design from an average secrecy rate based
optimization perspective for point-to-point multi-antenna aided
channels and relay channels [18][19] supporting delay-tolerant
systems. For systems imposing stringent delay constraints,
especially in imperfect CSI scenarios, perfect secrecy cannot
always be achieved. Hence, the secrecy outage-based charac-
terization of systems is more appropriate, which provides a
probabilistic performance measure of secure communication.
The concept of secrecy-outage was adopted in [20] for char-
acterizing the probability of having both reliable and secure
transmission, which, however, is inapplicable for the imperfect
CSI case and fails to distinguish a connection-outage from the
secrecy-outage. [21] proposed an alternative secrecy-outage
formulation for characterizing the attainable security level
and provided a general framework for designing transmission
schemes that meet specific target security requirements. In
order to quantify both the reliability and security performance
at both the legitimate and the eavesdropper nodes separately,
two types of outages, namely the connection outage probability
(COP) and secrecy outage probability (SOP) are introduced.
Then, considering the impact of time delay causing by the
antenna selection process at the legitimate receiver, Hu et. al
in [22] proposed a new secure transmission scheme in the
multi-input multi-output multi-eavesdropper wiretap channel.
Much recently, considering the outdated CSI from the legiti-
mate receiver, a new secure on-off transmission scheme was
proposed for enhancing the secrecy throughput in [23].
Moreover, prior studies of the outage-based secure trans-
mission design are limited to single-antenna assisted single-
hop systems and have not been considered for cooperative
relaying systems. Hence, the issues of secure transmissions
over cooperative relaying channels expressed in terms of
the SOP, COP and secrecy throughput constitute an open
problem. On the other hand, apart from CEE, the CSI feedback
delay results in critical challenges for the PLS of cooperative
relaying systems, especially, when considering the specifics
of RN/JN selection. The authors of [15] have also investi-
gated the effects of outdated CSI knowledge concerning the
legitimate links on the ergodic secrecy rate achieved by the
proposed secure transmission strategy in the context of DF
relaying. The impact of CSI feedback delay on the secure
relay and jammer selection conceived for DF relaying was
investigated in [24], albeit only in terms of the SOP. In our
previous study [25], we considered the secure transmission
design and secrecy performance of an opportunistic DF system
relying on outdated CSI, where only a single relay is invoked.
Additionally, during the revision of this work, we investigated
the security performance for outdated AF relay selection in
[26]. Therefore, in this treatise, we extend our investigations
to the PLS of multiple AF relaying assisted networks relying
on RN/JN selection.
Explicitly, we focus our attention on the outage-based
characterization of secure transmissions in cooperative relay-
aided networks relying on realistic CSI feedback delay. To
exploit the multi-relay induced diversity gain and the associ-
ated jamming capabilities, joint AF relay node and jammer
node selection is employed by the relay-destination link. We
assume that in line with the practical reality, the instantaneous
eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable at the legitimate transmitter
and that the RN/JN selections are performed based on the
outdated CSI of the main links. Two types of cooperative
strategies are invoked by our cooperative network operating
under secrecy constraints, namely the traditionally best relay
selection (TBRS) strategy as well as the joint relay and jammer
selection (JRJS) strategy. Specifically, the main contributions
of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We develop an outage-based characterization for quanti-
fying both the reliability and security performance of a
two-hop AF relaying system. Specifically, in contrast to
[21][22], we propose the novel definition of the reliable-
and-secure connection probability (RSCP). Explicitly,
closed-form expressions of the COP, SOP, and RSCP are
derived for both the TBRS and for our JRJS strategies.
Numerical results demonstrate that the JRJS scheme
outperforms the TBRS scheme in terms of its RSCP.
• We also introduce the reliability-security-ratio (RSR)
for characterizing their direct relationship by a single
parameter through the asymptotic analysis of the COP
and SOP in the high-SNR regime. We derive the RSR
for both the TBRS and JRJS strategies for investigating
the effect of secrecy codeword rate setting, as well as that
of the feedback delay and that of the power sharing ratio
between the relay and the jammer on the RSR.
• We then modify the definition of effective secrecy
throughput by multiplying the secrecy rate with the RSCP,
which results in an optimization problem of the transmit
SNR, secrecy codeword rate and power sharing between
the relay and jammer. It is shown that compared to
the TBRS strategy, the JRJS achieves a significantly
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Fig. 1. A cooperative relaying network assisted by multiple relays in the
presence of an eavesdropper.
higher effective secrecy throughput, and the correspond-
ing throughput loss is more sensitive to feedback de-
lays. The impact of the direct source-eavesdropper link
and additional throughput performance comparisons with
respect to other related selection schemes are further
discussed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces our system model and describes both the TBRS
and our JRJS strategies. In Section III and Section IV, we
present the mathematical framework of our performance anal-
ysis both for the TBRS strategy and for the JRJS strategy,
respectively, including the COP, SOP, RSCP, RSR and the
effective secrecy throughput. Our numerical results and dis-
cussions are provided in Section V. Finally, Section VI offers
our concluding remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Description
Consider a cooperative relaying network consisting of a
source S, a destination D, Kr relays Rk, k = 1, · · · ,Kr, and
an eavesdropper E, as shown in Fig. 1, where all nodes are
equipped with a single transmit antenna (TA), except for the
source which has Nt TAs. The cooperative relay architecture
of Fig. 1 is generally applicable to diverse practical wireless
systems in the presence of an eavesdropper, including the
family of wireless sensor networks (WSNs), mobile ad hoc
networks (MANETs) and the long term evolution (LTE)-
advanced cellular systems [11].
To exploit the diversity potential of multiple relay nodes
over independently fading channels, AF relay/jammer selec-
tion is employed. All relays operate in the half-duplex AF
mode and data transmission is performed in two phases.
More particularly, during the broadcast phase, the source
node transmits its signal to a selected relay with the aid of
beamforming (BF), which is invoked for forwarding the signal
received from S to D. An inherent assumption is that the
transmit BF weights are based on the CSI estimates quantified
and fed back by the selected relay. During the cooperative
phase, a pair of appropriately selected relays transmit towards
D and E, respectively. A conventional relay (denoted as R∗)
forwards the source’s message to the destination. Another
relay (denoted as J∗) operates in the “jammer mode” and
imposes intentional interference upon E in order confuse it.
However, the D is unable to mitigate the artificial interference
emanating from the jammer node J∗ due to its critical secrecy
constraints [12]. It should be noted that both the process of
RN/JN selection and the feedback of the transmit BF weights
from R∗ to the S may impose a time-lag between the data
transmission and channel estimation. These time delays are
denoted by TdSR and TdRD , respectively. Furthermore, we
assume that the BF and RN/JN selection process is based
on the perfectly estimated but outdated CSI. We employ the
first-order autoregressive outdated CSI model of [20], whilst
relying on the correlation coefficients of ρSR = J0(2pifdTdSR)
and ρRD = J0(2pifdTdRD) for the two hops, where J0 (·) is
the zero-order Bessel function of the first kind and fd is the
Doppler frequency.
A slow, flat, block Rayleigh fading environment is as-
sumed, where the channel remains static for the coherence
interval (one slot) and changes independently in different
coherence intervals, as denoted by hi,j ∼ CN (0, σ2i,j), i, j ∈
{S,R, J,D,E}. The direct communication links are assumed
to be unavailable due to the presence of obstructions between
S and D as well as the eavesdropper1. This assumption follows
the rationale of [12] and has been routinely exploited in
previous literature (see [27][28] and the references therein),
where the source and relays belong to the same cluster,
while the destination and the eavesdropper are located in
another. More specifically, this assumption is especially valid
in networks with broadcast and unicast transmission, where
each terminal is a legitimate receiver for one signal and
acts as an eavesdropper for some other signal. Therefore, the
security concerns are only related to the cooperative relay-
aided channel. Furthermore, additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) is assumed with zero mean and unit variance N0.
Let Pi be the transmit power of node i and the instantaneous
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the i → j link is given by
γi,j = Pi |hi,j |
2
/
N0.
We employ the constant-rate Wyner coding scheme for
constructing wiretap codes of [2] in order to meet the PLS
requirements due to the fact that the accurate global CSI
is not available. Let C (R0, Rs, N) denote the set of all
possible Wyner codes of length N , where R0 is the codeword
transmission rate and Rs is the confidential information rate
(R0 > Rs). The positive rate difference Re = R0 − Rs
is the cost of providing secrecy against the eavesdropper. A
confidential message is encoded into a codeword at S and then
transmitted to D.
B. Secure Transmission
In the broadcast phase, S transmits its BF signal s(t) to
the selected relay R∗, where the relay selection is performed
before data transmission commences and the selection cri-
terion will be detailed later in the context of the cooper-
1The case when the S → E link is introduced will be investigated
separately in Section VI.
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ative phase. The transmit BF vector w( t| Td) is calculated
using the perfectly estimated but outdated CSI given by
w( t|TdSR) = h
H
SR∗(t− Td)
/
|hSR∗(t− TdSR)| [29], where
we have hSR∗(t) = [hSR∗,1(t), . . . , hSR∗,Nt(t)]
T
, and the
signal received by the relay R∗ can be written as
yR∗(t) =
√
Psw( t|Td)hSR∗(t)s(t) + nSR∗(t), (1)
where nSR∗(t) is the AWGN at the relay. Then we can
define the received SNR at the relay node as γSR =
PS |w( t| TdSR)hSR∗(t)|
2
/
N0.
In the cooperative phase, we consider two RN/JN selection
schemes performed by D: relay selection without jamming, as
well as joint relay and jammer selection, respectively.
1) Traditional Best Relay Selection: The first category of
solutions does not involve a jamming process and therefore
only a conventional relay accesses the channel during the
second phase of the protocol. The relay selection process is
performed based on the highest instantaneous SNR of the
second hop, formulated as
R∗ = arg max
Rk∈R


γ˜RkD
E [γRkE ]
=
PR
∣∣∣h˜RkD(t− Td)∣∣∣2
N0E [γRkE ]

 , (2)
where γ˜RkD is the instantaneous SNR in the relay selection
process, E [γRkE ] denotes the average SNR at E. We can
model γRkD and γ˜RkD as two gamma distributed RVs having
the correlation factor of ρ2RD .
During the second phase, the received signal
yR∗(t) is multiplied by a time-variant AF-relay
gain G and retransmitted to D, where we have
G =
√
PR
/(
PS |wopt( t|TdSR)hSR∗(t)|
2
+N0
)
. After
further mathematical manipulations, the mutual information
(MI) between S, and D as well as the eavesdropper can be
written as
ITBRSD =
1
2
log
(
1+γTBRSD
)
=
1
2
log
(
1+
γSRγR∗D
γSR+γR∗D+1
)
(3)
and
ITBRSE =
1
2
log
(
1+γTBRSE
)
=
1
2
log
(
1+
γSRγR∗E
γSR+γR∗E+1
)
.
(4)
2) Joint Relay and Jammer Selection: Similarly, consider-
ing the unavailability of the instantaneous CSI regarding the
eavesdropper, we adopt a suboptimal RN/JN selection metric
conditioned on the outdated CSI as
R∗ = arg max
Rk∈R
{
γ˜RkD
E[γRkE]
}
,
J∗ = arg min
Rk∈R−R∗
{
γ˜RkD
E[γRkE]
}
,
(5)
where J∗ is selected for minimizing the interference imposed
on D.
It should be noted that to having the same transmit power
as that of the TBRS case, we assume PR∗ + PJ∗ = PR for
our JRJS strategy and introduce λ = PR∗/(PR∗ + PJ∗) as the
ratio of the relay’s transmit power to the total power required
by the active relay and jammer.
In the cooperative phase, R∗ will also amplify the received
signal yR∗(t) by G and forward it to D. At the same
time, the jammer J∗ will generate intentional interference in
order to confuse E, which will also cause interference at D.
Consequently, the MI between the terminals is given by
IJRJSD =
1
2
log
(
1+γJRJSD
)
=
1
2
log
(
1+
γSR
γR∗D
γJ∗D+1
γSR+
γR∗D
γJ∗D+1
+1
)
,
(6)
IJRJSE =
1
2
log
(
1+γJRJSE
)
=
1
2
log
(
1+
γSR
γRE
γJE+1
γSR+
γRE
γJE+1
+1
)
. (7)
Remark 1: Generally, the optimal RN/JN selection scheme
should take into account the global SNR knowledge set
{γSR, γRD, γRE}. However, given the potentially excessive
implementational complexity overhead of the optimal selection
schemes and the unavailability of the global CSI, we employ
suboptimal selection schemes as in [12]2. Furthermore, it is
commonly assumed that the average SNR of the eavesdropper
is available at the transmitter, which seem some how not
reasonable. However, as stated in most of the literature, such
as [12-22, 24-28, 30], provided that the eavesdropper belongs
to the network, which is also the case in our paper, the
related assumption might still be deemed reasonably. Addi-
tionally, as in [8, 11, 12, 24], for mathematical convenience
we assume that the relaying channels are independent and
identically distributed and that we have E [γSRk ] = γ¯SR,
E [γRkD] = γ¯RD and E [γRkE ] = γ¯RE . The distances between
the relays are assumed to be much smaller than the distances
between relays and the source/destination/evesdropper, hence
the corresponding path losses among the different relays are
approximately the same. This assumption is reasonable both
for WSNs and for MANETs associated with a symmetric
clustered relay configuration and it may also be satisfied is
also valid by classic cellular systems in a statistical sense [11].
III. SECURE TRANSMISSION WITHOUT JAMMING
In this section, we endeavor to characterize both the relia-
bility and security performance comprehensively of the TBRS
scheme. We first derive closed-form expressions for both the
COP and SOP. Then, the RSR is introduced through the
asymptotic analysis of the COP and SOP. Furthermore, we
propose the novel definition of the RSCP and the effective
secrecy throughput.
A. COP and SOP
When the perfect instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper’s
channel and even the legitimate users’ channel is unavailable,
alternative definitions of the outage probability may be adopted
for the statistical characterization of the attainable secrecy
performance, especially for delay-limited applications. Based
2To further alleviate the cooperation related overhead, the selection criterion
is based on the R → D link, since the second-hop plays a dominant role in
determining the received SNR, because the first hop corresponds to a MISO
channel with the aid of with multiple antennas and hence it is more likely to
be better than the second hop. The optimal selection based on both hops is
beyond the scope of this work.
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on [31, Definition 2], perfect secrecy cannot be achieved,
when we have Re < IE , where IE denotes the MI be-
tween the source and eavesdropper. Encountering this event
is termed as a secrecy outage. Furthermore, the destination is
unable to flawlessly decode the received code words when
R0 > ID, which is termed as a connection outage. The
grade of reliability and the grade of security maintained by
a transmission scheme may then be quantified by the COP
and SOP, respectively.
We continue by presenting our preliminary results versus the
point-to-point SNRs. Let us denote the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) and probability density function (PDF) of a
random variable X by FX(x) and fX(x), respectively. On
one hand, the PDF of γSR using [29, Eq. (15)], is given by
fγSR(x)=
Nt−1∑
n=0
(
Nt−1
n
)
ρ
2(Nt−1−n)
SR (γ¯SR(1−ρ
2
SR))
n
γ¯NtSR(Nt−1−n)!
xNt−1−ne
−x
γ¯SR ,
(8)
while its CDF is given by
FγSR(x)=1−
Nt−1∑
n=0
Nt−1−n∑
m=0
(
Nt−1
n
)
ρ
2(Nt−1−n)
SR (1−ρ
2
SR)
n
m!γ¯mSR
xme
−x
γ¯SR .
(9)
On the other hand, for the instantaneous SNR of the R→ D
hop, according to the principles of concomitants or induced
order statistics, the CDF of γR∗D , can be derived as in [32]
FγR∗D (y)=Kr
Kr−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
Kr − 1
k
)
1−e
−(k+1)y
(k(1−ρ2
RD
)+1)γ¯RD
k + 1
. (10)
Thus, the COP of the TBRS strategy is given by
PTBRSco (R0) = Pr
[
ITBRSD < R0
]
= FγTBRS
D
(
γDth
)
, (11)
where we have γDth = 22R0 − 1 and the CDF of γTBRSD can
be calculated as
FγTBRSD
(x)=1−
∫ ∞
0
[
1−FγR∗D
(
xz+x(x+1)
z
)]
fγSR∗ (z+x)dz.
(12)
Consequently, by substituting (8) and (10) into (12), and
using [33, Eq. (3.471.9)], we arrive at a closed-form expression
for FγTBRS
D
(x) as
FγTBRSD
(x)=1−2
Nt−1∑
n=0
Kr−1∑
k=0
Nt−1−n∑
m=0
(−1)kKr
(
Nt−1
n
)(
Kr−1
k
)
×
(
Nt−1−n
m
)
ρ
2(Nt−1−n)
SR
(1−ρ2SR)
nxNt−1−n−m
(Nt−1−n)!(k+1)γ¯
Nt−n
SR
[
γ¯SRx(x+1)
ωkγ¯RD
]m+1
2
×e
−
(
γ¯SR+ωkγ¯RD
ωkγ¯SRγ¯RD
)
x
Km+1
(
2
√
x(x+1)
ωk γ¯SRγ¯RD
) ,
(13)
where we have ωk = k(1−ρ
2
RD)+1
k+1 . Then, by substituting x =
γDth into (13), we obtain PTBRSco .
Furthermore, the SOP of the TBRS strategy may be ex-
pressed as
PTBRSso (R0, Rs)=Pr
[
ITBRSE >R0−Rs
]
=1−FγTBRS
E
(
γEth
)
,
(14)
where we have γEth = 22(R0−Rs) − 1. Similarly, we may
calculate the CDF of γTBRSE in (14) as
FγTBRSE
(x)=1−2
Nt−1∑
n=0
Nt−1−n∑
m=0
(
Nt−1
n
)(
Nt−1−n
m
)
×
ρ
2(Nt−1−n)
SR
(1−ρ2SR)
nxNt−1−n−m
(Nt−1−n)!γ¯
Nt−n
SR
[
γ¯SRx(x+1)
γ¯RE
]m+1
2
× e
−
(
γ¯SR+γ¯RE
γ¯SRγ¯RE
)
x
Km+1
(
2
√
x(x+1)
γ¯SRγ¯RE
) . (15)
Then, by substituting x = γEth into (15), we can derive
PTBRSso .
The COP and SOP in (11) and (14) characterize the attain-
able reliability and security performance, respectively, and can
be regarded as the detailed requirements of accurate system
design. From the definition of COP and SOP, it is clear that the
reliability of the main link can be improved by increasing the
transmit SNR (or decreasing its data rate) to reduce the COP,
which unfortunately increases the risk of eavesdropping. Thus,
a tradeoff between reliability and security may be struck, de-
spite the fact that closed-from expressions cannot be obtained
as in [11]. Furthermore, we denote the minimal reliability and
security requirements by υ and δ, where the feasible range
of the reliability constraint is 0 < υ < 1. Bearing in mind
that the COP is a monotonously increasing function of R0,
the corresponding threshold of the codeword transmission rate
is Rth0 = arg
{
PTBRSco (R0) = υ
}
, which leads to a lower
bound of the SOP, when we have (R0 −Rs) → Rth0 . Thus,
the feasible range of δ is PTBRSso
(
Rth0 , 0
)
< δ < 1. The
above analysis indicates that given a reliability constraint υ,
the lower bound of the security constraint is determined.
B. Reliability-Security Ratio
In this subsection, we will focus our attention on the
asymptotic analysis of the COP and SOP in the high-SNR
regime. Then, inspired by [25], we introduce the concept of
the reliability-security ratio (RSR) for characterizing the direct
relationship between reliability and security.
Proposition 1: Based on the asymptotic probabilities of Pco
and Pso at high SNRs3, the reliability-security ratio is defined
as
Pco (R0) = Λ [1− Pso (R0, Rs)] , (16)
where Λ = limη→∞ Pco/(1− Pso), which represents the im-
provement in COP upon decreasing the SOP. More specifically,
since the reduction of the SOP/COP must be followed by an
improvement of COP/SOP, a lower Λ implies that when the
security is reduced, the reliability is improved and vice versa.
Thus, for the TBRS scheme studied above, the RSR is derived
as
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
Remark 2: It can be seen from the above expression that
the factor Λ is independent of the transmit SNR, but directly
depends on the channel gains, the rate-pair (R0, Rs) and on
the number of transmit antennas and relays. For a given Rs,
reducing R0 to enhance the reliability may erode the security,
3Assuming equal power allocation between S and the relay, yielding PS =
PR = P , and define η = P/N0 as the transmit SNR [24].
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ΛTBRS =
[(
1− ρ2SR
)Nt−1
+
Kr−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
Kr − 1
k
)
Krσ
2
SR
[k(1−ρ2RD)+1]σ2RD
] (
22R0 − 1
)
[
Nt (1− ρ2SR)
Nt−1 + σ2SR
/
σ2RE
] (
22(R0−Rs) − 1
) (17)
because (R0 −Rs) is also reduced. Conversely, increasing
R0 provides more redundancy for protecting the security of
the information, but simultaneously the reliability is reduced.
Hence, the RSR analysis underlines an important point of view
concerning how to balance the reliability vs security trade-
off by adjusting (R0, Rs). Furthermore, as long as a CSI
feedback delay exists, the RSR has an intimate relationship
with ρSR and ρRD . It is clear that the value of ΛTBRS
decreases as ρRD increases, which is due to the fact that
the relay selection process only improves the reliability of
the legitimate user. On the other hand, since we always have
the conclusion that
Kr−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
Kr−1
k
)
Kr
k(1−ρ2RD)+1
< 1, when
σ2RD and σ2RE are comparable, ΛTBRS will be reduced as ρSR
increases. This observation implies that although both Pco and
(1− Pso) are reduced when the first hop CSI becomes better,
the improvement of the reliability is more substantial than the
security loss, as ρSR increases.
C. Effective Secrecy Throughput
It should be noted that the COP and SOP metrics ignore the
correlation between these two outage events. More specifically,
in contrast to the point-to-point transmission case, since the
S → R link’s SNR included in the MI expressions of (3)
and (4), the secrecy outage and the connection outage are
definitely not independent of each other. Therefore, it might
be of limited benefit in evaluating the reliability or security
separately. We note furthermore that although another metric
referred to as the secrecy throughput was introduced as the
product of the successful decoding probability and of the
secrecy rate [21][22], this definition ignores the fact that a
reliable transmission may be insecure and the SOP is not taken
into consideration. Hence, this metric is unable to holistically
characterize the efficiency of our scheme, while is capable of
achieving both reliable and secure transmission. Therefore, in
this section we redefine the effective secrecy throughput as the
probability of a successful transmission (reliable and secure)
multiplied by the secrecy rate, namely as ς = RsPR&S ,
where the reliable-and-secure connection probability (RSCP)
is defined as
PR&S = Pr {ID > R0, IE < R0 −Rs} . (18)
Upon substituting the expressions of ID and IE in (3) and
(4) into (18), we can rewrite PR&S for the TBRS strategy in
(19).
Finally, using the corresponding CDFs and PDFs of (8), (9)
and (10) from our previous analysis, we can obtain PTBRSR&S
in (20) as well as the secrecy throughput.
Furthermore, considering the asymptotic result for RSCP at
high SNRs in (20) by applying the approximation Kv (x) ≈
(v − 1)!/2 (x/2)v and closing the highest terms of η after in-
voking the McLaurin series representation for the exponential
function, the asymptotic effective secrecy throughput can be
approximated as in (21).
Remark 3: Given the definition of COP, SOP and the se-
crecy throughput result of (21), it can be shown that for a fixed
Rs, if R0 is too small, even though PR&S may be high (i.e.
close to one), the value of ς remains small. By contrast, if R0
is too large, the value of Pco is close to one and therefore ς
will also become small. This observation is also suitable for
Rs. Thus, as pointed out in the RSR analysis, it is elusive
to improve both the reliability and security simultaneously,
but both of them are equally crucial in terms of the effective
secrecy throughput which depends on the rate pair (R0, Rs).
Additionally, (21) also reveals that increasing the SNR
would drastically reduce the effective secrecy throughput. For
high transmit SNRs, a high reliability can indeed be perfectly
guaranteed, but at the same time, the grade of the security
is severely degraded. However, the probability of a reliable
and simultaneously secure transmission will tend towards zero.
Hence, we may conclude that there exists an optimal SNR
which achieves the maximal secrecy throughput.
In conclusion, adopting the appropriate code rate pair and
transmit SNR is crucial for achieving the maximum effective
secrecy throughput, which can be formulated as
max
R0,Rs,η
ς (R0, Rs) = RsP
TBRS
R&S
s.t.Pco ≤ υ, Pso ≤ δ, 0 < Rs < R0
, (22)
where υ and δ denote the system’s reliability and security
requirements. Unfortunately, it is quite a challenge to find
the closed-form optimal solution to this problem due to the
complexity of the expressions. Although suboptimal solutions
can be found numerically (with the aid of gradient-based
search techniques), the secrecy throughput optimization prob-
lem as well as the corresponding complexity analysis and
performance comparisons are beyond the scop of this work.
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION WITH JAMMING
In this section, we consider the extension of the above
relay selection approaches to systems additionally invoking
relay-aided jamming. The joint relay and jammer selection is
based on the outdated but perfectly estimated CSI and the
details have been presented in Section II. We would also
like to investigate the security performance from an outage-
based perspective. The COP, SOP, RSCP and effective secrecy
throughput will be included.
A. COP and SOP
It is plausible that the main differences between the JRJS
and TBRS schemes are determined by the instantaneous SNR
of the R → D hop, where now a jammer is included.
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PTBRSR&S =Pr
{{
γSR>γ
D
th, γR∗D>
γDthγSR+γSR
γSR−γ
D
th
}
∩
[{
γSR>γ
E
th, γR∗E<
γEthγSR+γSR
γSR−γ
E
th
}
∪
{
γSR<γ
E
th
}]}
= Pr
{
γSR > γ
D
th, γR∗D > γ
D
th +
γDth(γ
D
th+1)
γSR−γ
D
th
, γR∗E < γ
E
th +
γEth(γ
E
th+1)
γSR−γ
E
th
}
. (19)
PTBRSR&S =
∫∞
γD
th
[
1− FγR∗D
(
γDth +
γDth(γ
D
th+1)
x−γD
th
)]
FγR∗E
(
γEth +
γEth(γ
E
th+1)
x−γE
th
)
fγSR∗ (x) dx
≈ 2
Nt−1∑
n=0
Kr−1∑
k=0
Nt−1−n∑
m=0
(−1)k
(
Kr−1
k
)(
Nt−1
n
)(
Nt−1−n
m
)
Krρ
2(Nt−1−n)
SR (1−ρ
2
SR)
n
(γDth)
Nt−1−n−m
(Nt−1−n)!(k+1)γ¯
Nt−n−(m+1)/2
SR
× exp
[
−
(
γDth
γ¯SR
+
γDth
ωkγ¯RD
)][(
γDth(γ
D
th+1)
ωkγ¯RD
)
m+1
2 Km+1
(
2
√
γD
th(γDth+1)
ωkγ¯SRγ¯RD
)
−exp
(
−γEth
γ¯RE
)(
γDth(γDth+1)
ωkγ¯RD
+
γEth(γEth+1)
γ¯RE+γDth−γ
E
th
)
m+1
2 Km+1
(
2
√
γD
th(γDth+1)
ωkγ¯SRγ¯RD
+
γE
th(γEth+1)
γ¯SR(¯γRE+γDth−γEth)
)]
. (20)
ς˜TBRS(R0, Rs, η)=Rs
{
1−
[
Nt
(
1−ρ2SR
)
Nt−1
σ2SR
+
Kr−1∑
k=0
Kr(−1)k
[k (1−ρ2RD)+1]σ
2
RD
(
Kr−1
k
)]
22R0−1
η
}
22(R0−Rs)−1
σ2REη
. (21)
Based on our preliminary results detailed for the point-to-
point SNRs in (8) and (10), we now focus our attention
on the statistical analysis of the SNR including J∗. As
stated for the JRJS scheme in Section II, J∗ corresponds
to the lowest γ˜RkD and is selected from the set {R −R∗}.
Recalling that R∗ is the best relay of the second hop, we
have γ˜J∗D = minRk∈R−R∗ {γ˜RkD}
∆
= minRk∈R {γ˜RkD} for
Kr > 1. Using the induced order statistics, the corresponding
CDF of γR∗D is presented in (10), while the PDF of γJ∗D
can be formulated as
fγJ∗D (x) =
Kr exp
(
−Krx
[(Kr−1)(1−ρ2RD)+1]γ¯JD
)
[(Kr − 1) (1 − ρ2RD) + 1] γ¯JD
. (23)
Although the relay and jammer selection processes are not
entirely disjoint, we may exploit the assumption that γR∗D
and γJ∗D are independent of each other, which is valid when
the number of relays is sufficiently high, as justified in [24].
Let us define the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR)
of the second hop as ξD = γR∗D/(γJ∗D + 1), using (10) and
(23), whose CDF can be formulated as
FξD (x)=1−Kr
Kr−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
Kr−1
k
)
ϕke
−x
γ¯RDωk
(k+1) (x+ϕk)
, (24)
where we have ϕk = λKrωk[(Kr−1)(1−ρ2RD)+1](1−λ)
.
As far as the eavesdropper is concerned, γR∗E and γJ∗E
are independent and exponentially distributed. Furthermore,
for ξE = γR∗E/(γJ∗E + 1), we have
FξE (x) = 1−
φ
x+ φ
e
−x
γ¯RE , (25)
where φ = λ/(1− λ). According to the definition of COP
and SOP in the previous section, we can obtain the following
closed-form approximations of the COP and SOP4.
4When we have λ → 1, (24) will degenerate into the TBRS case seen in
(10). The performance analysis of the JRJS will be presented separately in
the following, since several approximations have to be included.
Lemma 1: The COP and SOP of the JRJS strategy associ-
ated with feedback delays is approximated by
P JRJSco (R0)≈1−
Nt−1∑
n=0
Kr−1∑
k=0
Nt−1−n∑
m=0
(
Nt−1
n
)(
Kr−1
k
)(
Nt−1−n
m
)
(−1)k(Kr+1)ρ
2(Nt−1−n)
SR (1−ρ
2
SR)
n
(Nt−1−n)!(k+1)γ¯
Nt−n
SR
Γ(m+2)ϕˆk(γDth)
Nt−n(γDth+1)
m+1
(γDth+ϕˆk)
m+2
exp
[
− γ
D
th(ϕˆk−1)
γ¯SR(γDth+ϕˆk)
]
Γ
(
−m− 1, γ
D
th(γ
D
th+1)
γ¯SR(γDth+ϕˆk)
) ,
(26)
where ϕˆk = Krλωkησ
2
RD
[(Kr−1)(1−ρ2RD)+1](1−λ)ησ2RD+Kr
, and
P JRJSso (R0, Rs)≈
Nt−1∑
n=0
Nt−1−n∑
m=0
(
Nt−1
n
)
ρ
2(Nt−1−n)
SR (1−ρ
2
SR)
n
m!γ¯mSR
×
(2γEth)
m
φ
(2γEth+φ)
exp
[
−
(
2γEth
γ¯SR
+
2γEth
γ¯RE
)] .
(27)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
The feasible range of the reliability constraint is similar to
that of the TBRS strategy and hence it is omitted here.
B. Reliability-Security Ratio
Lemma 2: Recalling the definition in Section III, the RSR
for the JRJS strategy may be expressed in (28).
It can be seen from the above expression that in contrast to
the analysis of the TBRS strategy operating without jamming,
for a fixed SNR threshold, the CDF of the second-hop SNR
will converge to a nonzero limit. We also find that this limit
is determined by the power sharing ratio between the relay
and the jammer. Furthermore, according to the analysis of
the TBRS strategy, for η → ∞, we have FγSR∗ (x) → 0.
Thus, by exploiting the tight upper bound that γTBRSD ≤
min {γSR, γR∗D} and γTBRSE ≤ min {γSR, γR∗E}, we have
P JRJS,∞co → FγξD
(
γDth
)
and 1 − P JRJS,∞so → FγξE
(
γEth
)
.
Finally, substituting the corresponding results into (16), we
arrive at the RSR of the JRJS strategy.
Remark 4: It can be seen from the RSR expression of (28)
again that the rate-pair setting (R0, Rs) has an inconsistent
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ΛJRJS=
(
22R0−1
)(
22(R0−Rs)−1
)Kr−1∑
k=0
(
Kr−1
k
)
(−1)kKr
[
(Kr−1) (1−ρ2RD)+1
] [(
λ−1−1
) (
22(R0−Rs)−1
)
+1
]
[(Kr−1)(1−ρ2RD)+1](k+1)(λ
−1−1) (22R0−1)+Kr [k(1−ρ2RD)+1]
. (28)
P JRJSR&S (R0, Rs, λ)≈
Nt−1∑
n=0
Kr−1∑
k=0
Nt−1−n∑
m=0
(−1)k
(
Nt−1
n
)(
Kr−1
k
)(
Nt−1−n
m
)
Krρ
2(Nt−1−n)
SR (1−ρ
2
SR)
n
ϕˆk(γDth)
Nt−1−n−m
(Nt−1−n)!(k+1)γ¯
Nt−n
SR (γDth+ϕˆk)e
γD
th
γ¯SR
+
γD
th
γ¯RDωk{
θm+11,k e
θ1
γ¯SR Γ (m+2)Γ
(
−m−1, θ1,k
γ¯SR
)
− φˆe
−γE
th/γ¯RE
(γEth+φ)(θ1,k−θ2)
Γ (m+3)
[
θm+22 e
θ2
γ¯SR Γ
(
−m−2, θ2
γ¯SR
)
−θm+21,k e
θ1
γ¯SR Γ
(
−m−2, θ1,k
γ¯SR
)]
+ Γ (m+ 2)
(
γDth − γ
E
th
) [
θm+12 e
θ2
γ¯SR Γ
(
−m− 1, θ2
γ¯SR
)
− θm+11,k e
θ1
γ¯SR Γ
(
−m− 1, θ1,k
γ¯SR
)]}
.
(31)
influence on the RSR and hence we have to carefully adjust
R0 and Rs in order to balance the reliability versus security
performance. Let us now focus our attention on the differences
between the JRJS scheme and the TBRS arrangement.
Firstly, we may find that the power sharing ratio λ be-
tween the relay and jammer plays a very important role.
The optimization of λ will be investigated from an effective
secrecy throughput optimization point of view in the following
subsection.
Secondly, it is plausible that in contrast to the behavior of
the TBRS strategy, ΛJRJS of (28) is only related to the delay
of the second hop, but it is still a monotonically decreasing
function of ρRD . This implies that the improvement of the
channel quality of the JRJS will achieve a more pronounced
COP improvement than the associated SOP improvement.
Furthermore, recalling that the RSR is considered in the high-
SNR region, it has no dependence on the first hop quality.
This is due to the fact that if the first hop channel quality
is sufficiently high for ensuring a successful transmission, the
asymptotic CDFs of ξD and ξE in (29) and (30) associated
with η → ∞ will converge to a nonzero limit at high SNRs,
which ultimately dominates the COP and SOP.
C. Effective Secrecy Throughput
Before proceeding to the effective secrecy throughput anal-
ysis, we also have to investigate the RSCP.
Lemma 3: The RSCP of our JRJS strategy may be ap-
proximated as in (31), where we have θ1,k = γ
D
th(γDth+1)
γD
th
+ϕˆk
,
θ2 = γ
D
th − γ
E
th +
γEth(γ
E
th+1)
γE
th
+φˆ
, and φˆ = λησ
2
RE
(1−λ)ησ2RE+1
.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
Apart from the rate-pair (R0, Rs), the above-mentioned
P JRJSR&S of (31) is also a function of the power sharing ratio λ
between the selected relay and the jammer.
Given the complexity of the RSCP expression, it is quite
a challenge to find a closed-form result for the maximizing
the effective secrecy throughput that max
0<λ<1
ς = RsP
JRJS
R&S .
Alternatively, we can focus on the asymptotic analysis in the
high-SNR region and try to find a general closed-form solution
for λ. Specifically, when we have η → ∞, P JRJSR&S will be
dominated by the channel quality of the second hop, hence
we have
P
JRJS,∞
R&S (R0, Rs, λ) ≈ Pr
{
ξD > γ
D
th, ξE < γ
E
th
}
=
[
1− FξD
(
γDth
)]
FξE
(
γEth
) , (32)
where the approximation is based on the fact that, in contrast
to both FξD
(
γDth
)
and FξE
(
γEth
)
, which converge to a nonzero
limit regardless of η, the first hop’s FγSR (x) will tend to zero
and hence it can be neglected. Substituting the asymptotic
results of (29) and (30) into (33), we can obtain P JRJS,∞R&S . In
contrast to the TBRS case operating without jamming, as the
SNR tends to ∞, the RSCP will tend to a nonzero value and
upon increasing the transmit SNR beyond a certain limit will
no longer increase the effective secrecy throughput.
Then, based on (32), we arrive at the approximated optimal
value λopt, which is the solution of the following equation
∂P
JRJS,∞
R&S (R0, Rs, λ)
∂λ
= 0. (33)
Then, by exploiting the approximation of[
k(1− ρ2RD) + 1
]/
(k + 1) ≈ 1 − ρ2RD in (29) for a
large ρRD (practically the CSI delay is small and ρRD → 1),
we have
λsubopt =
√
[(Kr − 1) (1− ρ2RD) + 1] γth√
[(Kr − 1) (1− ρ2RD) + 1] γth +
√
Kr(1 − ρ2RD)
,
(34)
where γth =
(
22R0 − 1
) (
22(R0−Rs) − 1
)
. It is clearly this
value is determined by the number of relays and (R0, Rs).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Both our numerical and Monte-Carlo simulation results
are presented in this section for verifying the theoretical
PLS performance analysis of the multiple-relay aided network
under CSI feedback delays. Explicitly, both the COP, SOP,
RSCP, and RSR are validated for both the TBRS and JRJS
strategies. Furthermore, the effect of feedback delays and sys-
tem parameters (including the transmission rate pair (R0, Rs)
and the power sharing ratio λ between the relay and jammer)
on the achievable effective secrecy throughput are evaluated.
The Rayleigh fading model is employed for characterizing all
communication links in our system. Additionally, we set the
total power to P = 1, σ2SR = σ2RD = σ2RE = 1, and used
TdSR = TdRD = Td.
Fig. 2 plots the COP and SOP versus the transmit SNR
for both the TBRS and JRJS strategies in conjunction with
different rate pairs. The analytical lines are plotted by using
Eqs. (11) and (14) for the TBRS strategy, and by using Eqs.
(26) and (27) for the TBRS case, respectively. It can be clearly
seen from the figure that the analytical and simulated outage
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Fig. 2. COP and SOP versus transmit SNR for the TBRS and JRJS strategies
in conjunction with different rate pairs, for Nt = Kr = 3, fdTd = 0.1, and
λ = 1/10.
probability curves match well, which confirms the accuracy
of the mathematical analysis. As expected, compared to the
TBRS strategy, the SOP of the JRJS strategy is much better,
while the COP is worse. We can also find that both the COP
and SOP will converge to an outage floor at high SNRs for
the JRJS strategy. The reason for this is that the jammer also
imposes interference on the destination and the interference
inflicted increases with the SNR. Thus, the designers have to
take into account the tradeoff between the reliability as wel as
security and the interference imposed on D, particularly when
considering the JRJS strategy. Moreover, we can observe in
Fig. 2 that increasing the transmission rate decreases the COP
and increases the SOP.
Fig. 3 further characterizes the SOP versus COP for both
the TBRS and JRJS strategies based on the numerical results
in Fig. 2, which shows the tradeoff between the reliability and
security. It can be seen from the figure that the SOP decreases
as the COP increases, and for a specific COP, the SOP of the
JRJS scheme is strictly lower than that of TBRS. This confirms
that the JRJS scheme performs better than the conventional
TBRS scheme. Furthermore, the CSI feedback delay will also
degrade the system tradeoff performance.
Fig. 4 illustrates the RSCP versus transmit SNR for the
TBRS strategy in the context of different network configura-
tions, including different rate pairs, different number of relays,
as well as both perfect and outdated CSI feedback scenarios.
The analytical lines are plotted by using the approximation
in (20). We may conclude from the figure that the rate pare
setting (R0, Rs) determines both the reliability and security
transmission performance. These curves also show that the
RSCP is a concave function of the transmit SNR, while
the continued boosting of the SNR would only decrease
the probability of a successful transmission. We can observe
from Fig.4 that for a high transmit SNR, total reliability
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Fig. 3. SOP versus COP for the TBRS and JRJS strategies with different
feedback delays for Nt = Kr = 3, Rs = R0/8, and λ = 1/10.
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Fig. 4. RSCP versus transmit SNR for the TBRS strategy with different rate
pairs for Nt = Kr = 3, fdTd = 0.1
can be guaranteed, whereas the associated grade of security
is severely eroded. Furthermore, increasing the number of
relays and decreasing the feedback delay will improve both
the reliability and security performance
The RSCP of the JRJS strategy is presented in Fig. 5
for different power sharing ratios between relaying and jam-
ming. Both the integration-form (45) and the approximated
closed-form in (31) match well with the Monte-Carlo sim-
ulations. The performance of the TBRS strategy is also in-
cluded for comparison. The JRJS scheme outperforms the
TBRS operating without jamming under the scenario con-
sidered, when encountering comparable relay-destination and
relay-eavesdropper channels. For some extreme configurations
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Fig. 5. RSCP versus transmit SNR for the JRJS strategy for different power
sharing ratios λ as well as for Nt = Kr = 3, fdTd = 0.1, and R0 =
1, Rs = R0/8.
(when the relay-eavesdropper links are comparatively weak)
this statement may not hold, but this scenario is beyond the
scope of this paper. The maximum RSCP appears at about
η = 15dB for the JRJS strategy using λ = 3/4, while it is
η = 10dB for the TBRS strategy. Furthermore, as expected,
increasing the number of available relays and jamming nodes
will always be able to improve the reliability and security
performance. However, the continued boosting of the jammer’s
power (decreasing λ) will not always improves the overall
performance, because the interference improves initially the
security, but then it starts to reduce the reliability, as λ
decreases. This further motivates the designer to carefully take
into account the power sharing between relaying and jamming.
The effect of the rate pair setting on the security and reliability
of the JRJS strategy is neglected here, which follows a similar
trend to that of the TBRS strategy.
Fig. 6 characterizes the RSR versus feedback delay and
power sharing ratio for both TBRS and JRJS, in which the
RSR curves are plotted by using (17) and (28), respectively.
The first illustration shows that the RSR decreases as the
delay coefficients (ρSR and ρRD), which confirms that the
improvement of reliability becomes more pronounced than the
reduction of the security as the feedback delay decreases. This
observation implies an improvement in terms of the security-
reliability tradeoff. Besides, the RSR versus ρRD is larger than
that of ρSR, which indicates that the impact of the second-hop
CSI feedback delay is more prominent. The other illustration
in the right demonstrates that the RSR is a concave function
of the power sharing ratio, which reflects the tradeoff between
the reliability and security struck by adjusting λ.
To further evaluate the effect of feedback delays on the
secrecy performance, Fig. 7 plots the resultant percentage of
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Fig. 6. RSR versus feedback delay coefficient (R0 = 1, Rs = R0/8, λ =
3/4) and power sharing ratio λ (Rs = R0/8, ρSR = ρRD = 0.9) for TBRS
and JRJS strategy with Nt = Kr = 3.
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Fig. 7. Percentage secrecy throughput loss versus delay coefficients with
Nt = Kr = 3, R0 = 1, Rs = R0/8, λ = 3/4 and η = 10dB.
secrecy throughput loss versus the delay, which is defined as
ςloss =
ςno−delay − ςdelay
ςno−delay
. (35)
It can be seen from the figure that compared to the TBRS
scheme, JRJS is more sensitive to the feedback delays. Fur-
thermore, recalling that increasing the delay coefficient ρSR
of the first hop improves the reliability, but at the same time
it also helps the eavesdropper, hence it is not surprising that
the secrecy throughput loss due to the second hop feedback
delay is more pronounced.
Fig. 8 illustrates the achievable effective secrecy throughput
for both the TBRS and JRJS strategies versus the codeword
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Fig. 9. Secrecy throughput versus R0 and λ for the JRJS strategy with
Nt = Kr = 3, fdTd = 0.1, η = 15dB and Rs/R0 = 1/8.
transmission rate R0 and the secrecy code ratio κ = Rs/R0
without any outage constraints (υ = δ = 1). The values
of the effective secrecy throughput are plotted by using
ς = RsPR&S . We can observe in Fig. 8 that subject to a fixed
code rate ratio, κ, the effective secrecy throughput increases
to a peak value as R0 reaches its optimal value, and then
decreases. This phenomenon can be explained as follows. At
a low transmission rate, although the COP increases with
R0, which has a negative effect on the effective secrecy
throughput, both the secrecy rate and the SOP performance
will benefit. However, after reaching the optimal R0, the
effective secrecy throughput drops since the main link cannot
afford a reliable transmission and the resultant COP increase
becomes dominant. On the other hand, subject to a fixed
R0 (which results in a constant COP), the effective secrecy
throughput is also a concave function of κ, and increasing
the code rate ratio ultimately results in an increased secrecy
information rate at the cost of an increased SOP.
The achievable effective secrecy throughput for the JRJS
strategy is also presented in Fig. 8 and similar conclusions as
well as trends can be observed to that of the TBRS case. Ad-
ditionally, the comparison of the two strategies indicates that
the JRJS scheme attains a higher effective secrecy throughput
than the TBRS scheme operating without jamming, even if no
power sharing optimization has been employed.
Fig. 9 further illustrates the impact of power sharing be-
tween the relay and the jammer on the achievable effective
secrecy throughput of the JRJS strategy versus R0 in the
absence of outage constraints. Given a fixed code rate pair
(R0, Rs), the effective secrecy throughput follows the trend
of the RSCP, which is a concave function of λ, as seen in
Fig. 6. The interference introduced by the jammer initially
improves both the reliability and security as λ increases, but
this trend is reversed beyond a certain point.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
A. Impact of the S-E Link
We note that the introduction of the S-E link, i.e. the
information leakage in the first phase, is very critical to the
security. There are also some researches focusing on the
corresponding secure transmission design and performance
evaluation for cooperative networks with the S-E link, such as
[15-16]. In this subsection, we assume that the eavesdropper
can receive information directly from the source in the first
phase. Thus, following the steps in the prior sections, for the
TBRS and JRJS schemes, it is clear that the SNR experienced
at the eavesdropper should be rewritten as
γ˜τE = γSE + γ
τ
E , (36)
where γSE = Ps |wopt (t |TdSR )hSE (t)|
2
/
N0 follows the
exponential distribution with the average value γ¯SE , τ =
{TBRS, JRJS}, and γτE has been defined in (4) and (7).
Then, the corresponding SOP, RSCP and effective secrecy
throughput have to be reconsidered. Unfortunately, to the best
of our knowledge, it is a mathematically intractable problem
to obtain closed-form results for the related performance
evaluations. Therefore, we resorted to numerical simulations
for further investigating the impact of the S-E link. Fig. 10
compares the effective secrecy throughput of the TBRS and
JRJS shcemes both with and without considering the direct
S-E link. It becomes clear that the information leakage in
the first phase will lead to a severe security performance
degradation, especially for the JRJS scheme, which will no
longer be capable of maintaining a steady throughput at high
SNRs. The reason for this trend is that increasing the transmit
SNR will help the eavesdropper in the presence of the direct
S-E link.
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B. Comparisons
In this subsection, based on the outdated CSI assumption,
we provide performance comparisons with a range of other
schemes advocated in [12] with the aid of the proposed
outage-based characterization. Fig. 10 also incorporates our
effective secrecy throughput performance comparison, where
the optimal selection (OS) regime as well as the optimal
selection combined with jamming (OSJ) were proposed in
[12]. They are formulated as
OS : R∗ = arg max
Rk∈R
{γ˜RkD/γ˜RkE} , (37)
and
OSJ :
{
R∗ = argmaxRk∈R {γ˜RkD/γ˜RkE}
J∗ = argminRk∈R−R∗ {γ˜RkD/γ˜RkE}
, (38)
where γ˜RkE is the delayed version of the instantaneous CSI
of the R-E link. It should be noted that this constitutes an
entirely new performance characterization of these schemes
from the perspective of the effective secrecy throughput. It can
be seen from Fig. 1 that the selection combined with jamming
outperforms the corresponding non-jamming techniques at
high SNRs, albeit this trend may no longer prevail at low
SNRs. Besides, compared to those selections relying on the
average SNRs of the R-E link, the optimal selections relying
on the idealized simplifying assumptions of having global
CSI (OS and OSJ schemes) knowledge can only achieve
throughput gains at high SNRs due to the inevitable feedback
delay.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
An outage-based characterization of cooperative relay net-
works was provided in the face of CSI feedback delays.
Two types of relaying strategies were considered, namely
the traditionally best relay selection strategy as well as the
joint relay and jammer selection strategy. Closed-form ex-
pressions of the connection outage probability, of the secrecy
outage probability and of the reliable-and-secure connection
probability as well as of the reliability-security-ratio were
derived. The RSR results demonstrated that the reliability is
improved more substantially than the security performance,
when the CSI feedback delays is reduced. Furthermore, we
presented a modified effective secrecy throughput definition
and demonstrated that the JRJS strategy achieves a significant
effective secrecy throughput gain over the TBRS strategy. The
transmit SNR, the secrecy codeword rate setting as well as the
power sharing ratio between the relay and jammer nodes play
important roles in striking a balance between the reliability and
security in terms of the secrecy throughput. The impact of the
direct S-E link and the performance comparisons with other
selection schemes were also included. Additionally, our results
demonstrate that the JRJS is more sensitive to the feedback
delays and that the secrecy throughput loss due to the second
hop feedback delay is more pronounced than that of the first
hop.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
In order to simplify the asymptotic performance analysis,
(3) can be expressed in a more mathematically tractable
form by the commonly used tight upper bound of γTBRSD ≤
min {γSR, γR∗D} and γTBRSE ≤ min {γSR, γR∗E}. When we
have η → ∞, based on the CDFs in (9) as well as (10) and
closing the smallest order terms of x/η, we have
FγSR (x)→1−
[
Nt−1∑
n=0
(
Nt−1
n
)
ρ
2(Nt−1−n)
SR (1−ρ
2
SR)
n+
Nt−2∑
n=0
(
Nt−1
n
)
×ρ
2(Nt−1−n)
SR (1−ρ
2
SR)
n x
γ¯SR
+O
(
x
γ¯SR
)] [
1− x
γ¯SR
+O
(
x
γ¯SR
)]
=1−
[
1+
(
1−
(
1−ρ2SR
)Nt−1) x
γ¯SR
+O
(
x
γ¯SR
)][
1− x
γ¯SR
+O
(
x
γ¯SR
)]
=
(
1− ρ2SR
)Nt−1 x
γ¯SR
+O
(
x
γ¯SR
)
,
(39)
where O (x) denotes the high-order infinitely small contribu-
tions as a function of x, and
FγR∗D (x)→ 1−
Kr−1∑
k=0
(−1)k Kr
k+1
(
Kr − 1
k
)
×
[
1− k+1
k(1−ρ2RD)+1
x
γ¯RD
+O
(
x
γ¯RD
)]
=
Kr−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
Kr−1
k
)
Kr
k(1−ρ2RD)+1
x
γ¯RD
+O
(
x
γ¯RD
) . (40)
Then, applying the upper bound of the receiver SNR, we
may rewrite the COP and SOP of the TBRS strategy at high
SNRs as
PTBRS,∞co = 1−
(
1− FγSR∗
(
γDth
)) (
1− FγR∗D
(
γDth
))
=
[
(1−ρ2SR)
Nt−1
σ2
SR
+
Kr−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
Kr−1
k
)
Kr
[k(1−ρ2RD)+1]σ2RD
]
22R0−1
η
(41)
and according to the fact that γR∗E is exponentially dis-
tributed, we have
1−PTBRS,∞so =1−
(
1−FγSR∗
(
γEth
)) (
1−FγR∗E
(
γEth
))
=
[
(1−ρ2SR)
Nt−1
σ2
SR
+ 1
σ2
RE
]
22(R0−Rs)−1
η
. (42)
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Finally, substituting (41) and (42) into the definition of RST
in (16), we can obtain (17).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
According to the description of COP and SOP, replacing
FγR∗D (x) and FγR∗E (x) by FξD (x) and FξE (x) in (12) and
(14) will involve a mathematically intractable integration of
the form:
Υ(a, b, µ, ν) =
∫ ∞
0
za
z + b
exp
(
−µz −
ν
z
)
dz, (43)
which, to the best of our knowledge, does not have a closed-
form solution. Alternatively, bearing in mind that the integra-
tion above has a great matter with ξD, we now focus our
attention on the approximation of ξD . Based on the PDF
results in (23), it may be seen that γJ∗D obeys an exponential
distribution. Then we can approximate γˆJ∗D = γJ∗D + 1
also by the exponential distribution with an average value of
E {γˆJ∗D} =
[(Kr−1)(1−ρ2RD)+1]γ¯RD+Kr
Kr
by assuming that the
AWGN term ’1’ is part of the stochastic mean terms. The
approximation based on this method provides an very accurate
analysis and the accuracy of this method is verified by the
numerical results of [34]. Thus, the CDF of ξˆD = γR∗D/γˆJ∗D
can be derived as
F
ξˆD
(x) =
Kr−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
Kr−1
k
)
Kr
k + 1
x
x+ ϕˆk
, (44)
where ϕˆk = E {γR∗D}E /{γˆJ∗D}.
Then, substituting (44) into (11), we have
FγJRJSD
(x)≈
Nt−1∑
n=0
Kr−1∑
k=0
Nt−1−n∑
m=0
(
Nt−1
n
)(
Kr−1
k
)(
Nt−1−n
m
)
×
(−1)kKrρ
2(Nt−1−n)
SR (1−ρ
2
SR)
n
ϕkx
Nt−1−n−me
−
x
γ¯SR
(Nt−1−n)!(k+1)γ¯
Nt−n
SR
(x+ϕk)
×
∫∞
0
zm+1
z+ x(x+1)
x+ϕk
exp
(
− z
γ¯SR
)
dz
.
(45)
Using [33, Eq. (3.383.10)], we can obtain the CDF of
γJRJSD as
FγJRJSD
(x)≈1−
Nt−1∑
n=0
Kr−1∑
k=0
Nt−1−n∑
m=0
(
Nt−1
n
)(
Kr−1
k
)(
Nt−1−n
m
)
×
(−1)k(Kr+1)ρ
2(Nt−1−n)
SR (1−ρ
2
SR)
n
(Nt−1−n)!(k+1)γ¯
Nt−n
SR
Γ(m+2)ϕˆkx
Nt−n(x+1)m+1
(x+ϕˆk)
m+2
× exp
[
− x(ϕˆk−1)
γ¯SR(x+ϕˆk)
]
Γ
(
−m− 1, x(x+1)
γ¯SR(x+ϕˆk)
) .
(46)
Finally, substituting x = γDth into (46), we obtain P JRJSco .
As far as the SOP is considered, we exploit the commonly
used tight upper bound of γJRJSE ≥ 12 min {γSR, ξE} to
calculate it, which may be rewritten as
P JRJSso ≈ Pr
{
1
2 min {γSR, ξE} > γ
E
th
}
=
[
1− FγSR
(
2γEth
)] [
1− FξE
(
2γEth
)] . (47)
Substituting (9) and (25) into (47), we obtain P JRJSso .
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
According to the definition of the RSCP in (18), we can
calculate it by
P JRJSR&S =
∫∞
0
[
1− FξD
(
γDth +
γDth(γ
D
th+1)
z
)]
× FξE
(
γEth +
γEth(γ
E
th+1)
z+γD
th
−γE
th
)
fγSR∗
(
z + γDth
)
dz
.
(48)
In order to make the integration mathematically tractable,
we invoke a simple approximation for FξE (x) by treating the
AWGN term ’1’ in ξE = γR∗E/(γJ∗E + 1) as part of the
stochastic mean terms. Hence we have
FξE (x) =
x
x+ φˆ
, (49)
where φˆ = λησ
2
RE
(1−λ)ησ2
RE
+1
.
Then, replacing the corresponding CDFs of the second hop
with F
ξˆD
(x) and F
ξˆE
(x) in (26), the integration can be
derived as
P JRJSR&S ≈1−
Nt−1∑
n=0
Kr−1∑
k=0
Nt−1−n∑
m=0
(−1)k
(
Nt−1
n
)(
Kr−1
k
)(
Nt−1−n
m
)
(Kr+1)ρ
2(Nt−1−n)
SR (1−ρ
2
SR)n
(Nt−1−n)!(k+1)γ¯
Nt−n
SR
ϕˆk(γDth)
Nt−1−n−m
γD
th
+ϕˆk
exp
(
−
γDth
γ¯SR
−
γDth
ωkγ¯RD
)
∫∞
0 e
−z
γ¯SR zm+1

 1
z+θ1,k
−
φˆ(z+γDth−γ
E
th)e
−γE
th
γ¯RE
(γEth+φˆ)(θ1,k−θ2)
(
1
z+θ2
− 1
z+θ1,k
)dz
,
(50)
where ϕˆk and φˆ are introduced by relying on the simi-
lar approximation as in Appendix B. Then, using [33, Eq.
(3.383.10)], we obtain P JRJSR&S .
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